On September 16, 2008, the Bush administration announced its determination that Bolivia had “failed demonstrably during the previous 12 months” to adhere to its “obligations under international counternarcotics agreements.” ¹  Ten days later, the Administration announced its intent to make Bolivia ineligible for benefits under the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA), asserting that “Bolivia’s demonstrable failure to cooperate in counternarcotics efforts over the past 12 months indicates that Bolivia is not meeting important criteria” to qualify for the tariff preferences. ²

The political arena in Bolivia last week was largely dominated by stilted dialogue between national and lowland departmental governments. Although negotiations face significant impediments, commissions formed to address specific points of friction, such as autonomy, represent an improvement over previous, largely symbolic efforts. However, continuing dialogue has been postponed until October 5.

The Washington Office on Latin America and the Institute for Policy Studies
 are pleased to invite you to a discussion 

The Bolivia Crisis for Beginners 
 
featuring

Kathryn Ledebur

Director, Andean Information Network (AIN)
Cochabamba, Bolivia

 
Link to the video:  http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-6645407603142203537&hl=en

Tensions persisted in Bolivia last week following violent protests and politically-motivated killings. The following chronological summary provides information about the national and international reactions to these events. 

Escalating Tensions and Increased Violence Demonstrate Widening Rifts between Media Luna, MAS Government, and the U.S. Embassy 

It appears that the sustained international attention given to the lowland prefects, and especially from the U.S., has emboldened them in their attempts to block Morales, regardless of the official message they receive from these diplomats.  Bolivian law only gives these prefects a mandate to carry out public works, welfare programs, and other budget initiatives.  They have far out-stepped these bounds.  By meeting with Santa Cruz prefect Ruben Costas during an escalation of the current conflict, Ambassador Goldberg gave the impression to all sides in Bolivia that Costas enjoyed U.S. support.  That day, Costas capitalized on this impression by refusing to swear in the new Departmental Police commander, appointed by the Morales administration, after protestors in Santa Cruz beat up his predecessor.  Yesterday’s declaration of Ambassador Goldberg as “persona non grata” is, in part a response to this impression after a long history of bilateral friction.

Bolivia’s Recall Referendum: Setting the Stage for Resumed Political Conflict, by Kathryn Ledebur of the Andean Information Network and John Walsh of the Washington Office on Latin America, discusses the history that led to the referendum and the potential ramifications of the upcoming vote.

Read full PDF version here.

On August 10, Bolivians will go to the polls in a referendum to decide whether the president, vice-president, and eight of the country’s nine departmental prefects (governors) will remain in office.¹ Opponents of President Evo Morales and the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) coalition have sought to cancel the upcoming recall referendum by challenging its legality, but it is unlikely that they will succeed.  The law authorizing the referendum was approved just months ago, in May, by the Bolivian Senate, where the opposition Poder Democrático y Social (PODEMOS) party enjoys a majority.  To be sure, the referendum’s passage chagrined sectors of the opposition at the departmental level, both because some prefects will be hard-pressed to garner enough votes to remain in office, and because the referendum is viewed as a distraction from the regional autonomy agenda that opposition prefects have been pursuing, especially in the “media luna” lowlands departments of Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando and Tarija.

The Bolivian Senate, with a slight opposition majority, inexplicably resurrected and approved the law to convoke the recall referendum that it had initially blocked after the MAS-dominated lower house of congress approved it.  President Morales opted to sign the bill into law, clearly beneficial to him, instead of vetoing the initiative and provoking harsh opposition criticism.

Within this convoluted context, it is not surprising that regional and other opposition forces continue to attempt to block the recall referendum.  The Morales administration and its allies have continued to staunchly support the vote, scheduled for August 10.  On July 22 the only remaining member of the Constitutional Tribunal emitted a legal criteria on a request submitted by UN congressman Arturo Murillo, stating that legal precedents exist to affirm that the referendum should be postponed until the Constitutional Tribunal (which has only one member, and as a result insufficient quorum to make rulings) rules on the constitutionality of the questions posed by the referendum.¹

On June 24, 2008 Chapare coca grower unions announced that they will no longer sign new aid agreements with USAID.¹  This announcement comes after two decades of poorly-focused policies, which did little to improve the lives of the majority of Chapare residents, especially during forced eradication. These development programs also provoked division and friction within the region by dividing communities and linking aid to controversial coca reduction. As a result, it is not surprising that Chapare coca growers made this decision; it is only surprising that they waited so long.  Furthermore, the announcement is largely a symbolic gesture; USAID plans to shift the bulk of its already restricted Chapare activities to the La Paz Yungas in the coming year, and Chapare municipalities have found other funding partners. According to the 2008 INSCR, “Relatively more resources will be devoted to the Yungas, an under-developed coca growing region ….Assistance to the Chapare will continue to decline….”  As a result, the number and scope of projects affected is minimal.