Bolivia's conflicts regarding the proposal to export the nation's gas to the US through a Chilean port proved to be the spark that fueled a much larger fire of national discontent. Arising from the din of the Gas War were demands for clarity in coca eradication laws, rejection of the ALCA free trade agreement, rejection of harsh national security legislature and demands for better wages. After more than a month of what might have become a fierce civil war, which produced nearly eighty dead and five hundred wounded, the president resigned.
INCOME TAX SETS OFF POLICE REBELLION
On February 11, the Bolivian National Police force threw up its hands in
La Paz and decided to not leave its stations. Although the force had
been a traditional ally of the MNR ruling party, increasing strength of
the armed forces, at the expense of internal law enforcement and the
economic crisis had caused deep-rooted resentment. Police forces in
Cochabamba and Santa Cruz joined the strike on February 12. The “mutiny”
is in response to the Sánchez de Lozada government’s announcement of a new
tax of approximately 12.5% to be deducted from all salaried employees who
received more than four times the minimum wage. The tax is in addition to
a pre-existing “added value” tax of 12.5%, which would be slightly
reduced. The salary deductions (including pension funds) of the average
Bolivian would increase to over 30%. As one citizen lamented, “We would
have to earn a living wage, before we could pay taxes on it.”
Originally published in the Miami Herald, Op-Ed section on Thursday, Nov. 14, 2002.
Bolivian President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada meets today with President
Bush in Washington, D.C. The perennial U.S. determination to fight drugs
by ripping up coca plants will certainly drive the meeting. As
representatives of NGOs who monitor drug policy in Bolivia, we hope that
the presidents face up to some uncomfortable facts.
U.S. international drug-control policy is ineffective. Over the last
decade, despite spending more than $25 billion on drug-control programs
overseas, more illicit drugs are available in the United States, and at
cheaper prices, than ever before. Plan Colombia was so profoundly
unsuccessful that coca cultivation in the Andean region increased 21
percent during the plan's first year.
Originally published in The Washington Post: Sep 29, 1995. pg. A.18.
The circle of coca growers in this small town drew closer when one of the leaders, a man who was sitting on a pink plastic sack filled with coca leaves, dropped the lofty arguments and delivered a more direct pitch.
"These are not mafiosos!" he declared. "We are talking, whether you believe it or not, about a vegetable product. Where do you see a chalet here? Do narco-traffickers dress like this?"
The little girl he pointed to was wearing an old T-shirt and old pants, a common uniform here in southern Bolivia's illegal coca belt, the Chapare. Some of the peasants, laconic coca growers waiting for middlemen to pick up their harvest, nodded as the man finished delivering the mantra of towns like this: Coca is not cocaine; peasants are not criminals.