The recent International Crisis Group Report, “Bolivia Rescuing the New Democratic Constitution and Democratic Stability,” presents a generally fair critique of MAS’s myriad of political errors in the current conflict, although it misrepresents some focal issues.  However, the Group fails to hold the political and regional opposition up to the same scrutiny, and provides only limited analysis on the procedural corners cut and norms violated by their initiatives and actions.  The unfortunate result is a series of recommendations that would center dialogue and the political agenda on the priorities of the Bolivian Right: autonomy-- a focus which would force MAS to make huge political concessions without any significant capitulation from opposition forces, further impeding dialogue.   Furthermore, the steps proposed in the document reveal a fundamental misunderstanding of the complex idiosyncrasies and dynamics of conflict within Bolivia. In addition, these misinterpretations detour analysis away from key issues to peripheral political obstacles.

In spite of recent more balanced and solidly-researched reports on drug policy with insightful proposals, recent Crisis Group analyses of Bolivian politics tend to get bogged down by the blow-by-blow of political friction in the nation, and have missed some underlying agendas and initiatives.   Isolated interviews with experts have apparently provided insufficient analytical framework within which to interpret such diverse and polarized views, and the analysis has been skewed unwittingly. The Group’s efforts in Bolivia would benefit greatly from the hiring of an independent analyst “in country” to help contextualize interviews and interpretations gathered during sporadic visits. Research by “teams of field analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak” would benefit from this addition. It is interesting to note that the Crisis Group hired current Minister of the Presidency, Juan Ramon Quintana, briefly to carry out this role before he became a government official.

Apparently, Miami is a parallel universe where reality can be distorted with impunity.  It's hard to know where to begin a critique of this June 17 Miami Herald editorial.  Although the protest was tense, this manipulative account is unforgivable.  Eduardo Gamarra also grossly distorts the background leading up to the protests.

Shortly after 10 am on June 9, several thousand protestors from El Alto marched into La Paz and surrounded the US Embassy. The mainly indigenous protestors were demanding the return of ex-President Sánchez de Lozada and ex-Minister of Defense Sánchez Berzaín to Bolivia. Both men are facing a civil suit in the US and charges in Bolivia for the death of almost 70 civilians during the 2003 "Guerra del Gas."

No member of the Bolivian security forces, or the political leaders that command them, have faced serious legal consequences for human rights violations.  Meaningful investigations and consequences for those responsible would set an important precedent, and help prevent further violations and cycles of violent conflict. Although the scale of human rights violations in Bolivia has lessened since the resignation of President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada in 2003, the continued use of the armed forces and the national police against civilian protesters has led to the shooting deaths of eleven civilians since 2004.  The Bolivian armed forces appear to be implicated in eight deaths, but have systematically refused to cooperate in any of these cases.

Morales administration promotes legislation to formalize a law enforcement role for the Military

Although the Vice Minister of Law Enforcement calls the military, “new actors,” they have been carrying out a wide variety of police duties since the Banzer administration.  While coca reduction is currently carried out through negotiations with farmers, the Joint Task Force continues to pull out coca plants.  Forced eradication could begin in the coming months in areas of new coca planting.

The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) and the Andean Information Network (AIN) are pleased to share with you the latest in a series of memos on drug control policy in Bolivia.  The memos are summarized briefly below and can be read in full by clicking on the titles.

The Coca Debate:  Headed toward Polarization or Common Ground?

In March 2008, the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB, a United Nations agency) provoked outrage in Bolivia by calling for the elimination of traditional uses of coca, such as chewing coca leaves and drinking coca tea.  Dismayed by the lack of sensitivity to indigenous cultures, President Evo Morales' government announced that it would formally request coca's declassification as a narcotic drug, as it is presently listed in the 1961convention.  Such a move would have no bearing on the status of cocaine under the conventions.

The Bush administration has been highly critical of the Morales administration's approach to coca, even while acknowledging Bolivia's intensified cocaine interdiction efforts.  Historically, the U.S. government has, as a practical matter, recognized the legitimacy of traditional uses of coca.  But recent U.S. statements in support of the INCB condemnation of coca chewing and coca tea raise the question as to whether the U.S. stance is shifting towards the radical position laid out by the INCB.  Such a shift would place the U.S. government dramatically at odds with Bolivia, throwing up additional obstacles to cooperation on what remains an important issue to both countries.  The U.S. government should now formally clarify its position on this matter.  Does the U.S. indeed endorse the INCB call for Bolivia and Peru to outlaw and eliminate traditional uses of coca?  Or does the U.S. continue to recognize the legitimacy and legality of traditional coca uses?  

Balancing Act:  Bolivia's Drug Control Advances and Challenges

Bolivian President Evo Morales's "coca yes, cocaine no" policy, which seeks to make a clear distinction between coca and cocaine, is now in its third year.  A fundamental pillar of the policy is cooperative coca reduction in the Chapare coca growing region and the extension of this approach into areas previously unaffected by forced coca eradication.  While the Morales administration's strategy has been met with skepticism by U.S. officials, the cooperative reduction approach may prove to be more successful in the long term in containing coca production than the previous forced-eradication strategy.  The Bolivian government is now facing serious challenges in carrying out its coca reduction strategy in the La Paz Yungas and in other areas of new coca planting.

There is growing international recognition of the need for a more effective approach to reducing crops destined for the illicit drug market - one which focuses on promoting alternative livelihoods and improved overall quality of life. Presently, the UN is carrying out an evaluation of the progress made over the last ten years in illicit drug consumption and production.  This review period is an appropriate moment for the U.S. government, other UN Member States, and the UN drug control bodies to reassess drug control strategies and work towards more humane and ultimately more effective alternatives by:

• Recognizing the failure of forced eradication policies to sustainably diminish the cultivation of coca destined for the illicit market;

• Supporting sustainable and integrated development efforts, without conditioning assistance on coca reduction, in Bolivia and other coca-producing countries;

• Advocating the removal of military forces from crop reduction efforts; and

• Recognizing and addressing the inconsistencies and contradictions in existing international drug control treaties regarding the coca leaf

Santa Cruz and the other lowland departments of Bolivia plan to go ahead with a referendum to approve autonomy statutes, setting a new system of government for the department on May 4^th.  Santa Cruz civic leaders forged ahead with their plans despite the National Electoral Court ruling forbidding the referendum and disapproval from the international community. Speculation and tension continue to soar and the potential for conflict and violence is high. Santa Cruz regional elites argue that the national constitutional draft which was nominally approved in December of 2007, primarily by MAS delegates, is illegal and invalid. The Morales administration claims that the vote on autonomy statutes is illegal because the new constitution already includes a process for departmental, regional, municipal and indigenous governments to obtain autonomy.  

The four memos in this series on Bolivian oil and gas policy and the challenges facing the nation is part of an ongoing project of the Andean Information Network and Erika Weinthal from the Nicholas School of the Environment and Earth Sciences at Duke University examining Bolivia’s efforts to confront the “resource curse.”

Part I: Background on Bolivian Oil and Gas Policy, Current Conflicts, and Challenges
Part II: Political Conflict over Gas and Oil Tax Distribution
Part III.  Increased Gas and Oil Revenues from Nationalization Benefit Various Projects
Part IV.  Accountability and Sustainability

Popular protests in Bolivia demanding greater benefits for the population from the country’s vast natural gas reserves contributed to the resignation of two presidents, the election of President Evo Morales, and the nationalization of the country’s oil and gas industry.  Rather than expropriation, the nationalization consisted of higher taxes on petroleum companies and renegotiated contracts.  As a result of the new policy and high gas prices, the Bolivian government’s income from the country’s oil and gas industry has increased dramatically, nine fold  between 2002 and 2007.  

The new funds present an opportunity to Bolivia, the poorest country in South America, to use this income for social and economic development to benefit the population.  But the revenues also present numerous challenges: developing a shared vision for the use of the revenues, determining an equitable distribution of resources, engaging the population and civil society in decision-making, investing resources wisely, and ensuring transparency and accountability – challenges which other resource rich countries have faced and failed.

Response to the Human Rights Foundation: 

Don’t mistake lynching and other forms of vigilante violence for community justice.

The report contains a basic error that invalidates its conclusions: The HRF report mistakes lynching and other forms of vigilante violence for community justice.

Bolivia’s Constitutional Assembly held a sixteen hour session December 8 and 9 in Oruro, and, according to the assembly members present and the Morales administration, approved the new constitution before the December 14 deadline.  However, opposition governors of Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, Tarija, and Cochabamba and opposition and pro-Sucre assembly members have declared the new charter illegal, because they interpret it as an attempt to consolidate power in the executive, and refuse to recognize it.  Moreover, the opposition departments will unveil their own “Autonomy Statutes” from December 13-15.  In La Paz, President Morales and assembly members will celebrate the approval of the new constitution.  These events will likely incur further conflicts unless the opposition and government begin to dialogue.

While President Morales’s statements have been uncharacteristically restrained, the opposition governors seem to be moving away from their normally diplomatic stance.  The governor of Santa Cruz made a doomsday statement saying, “Today we live a time of decision, our children’s present and future is at stake; we are in a historical moment that could mean the destruction of our homes, our jobs, and above all our very existence as free citizens…I call…on all free Bolivians in the country and in the world to organize and to protest and to take up the resistance in order to defend their rights and the consolidation of departmental autonomy.”¹