Introduction
After almost three weeks of tension in the Chapare coca-growing region, the Bolivian government signed a landmark agreement with coca growers to permit 3,200 hectares of coca to remain in the region for one year. Coca growers agreed to voluntarily eradicate approximately 3000 hectares of coca by the end of the year to meet an 8,000-hectare eradication quota. In addition, coca farmers accepted eradication in the two major national parks in the region, although the boundaries of these parks remain poorly defined. The accord represents a dramatic departure from past stilted efforts at dialogue, limited by U.S. government intervention, that had characterized negotiations and agreements since the 1998 initiation of Plan Dignity, an accelerated militarized eradication program, with the unattainable goal of total elimination of the Chapare coca crop, referred to as "zero coca" in Bolivia
The document also stipulates that a study of legal coca markets and consumption in Bolivia, part of a May 15, 2004 agreement, will be carried out within a year and will be used to determine future coca policy. Coca growers applauded the agreement, citing an end to the failed "zero coca" policy in the region. Uncharacteristically, U.S. Embassy officials did not express outright rejection of the accord, and instead chose to emphasize that it confirmed eradication efforts. This more strategic stance is in stark contrast to past blanket opposition to permitted coca production in the Chapare region, that had generated escalating levels of recurring conflict.
The October 3 truce should diffuse tensions and conflict that led to the death of one coca grower, the injury of over thirty others and at least seven members of the security forces. Coca growers agreed to suspend vigils and work with the Joint Task Force to identify and eliminate excess coca plants. There are many potential pitfalls in the agreement, and areas for future misunderstanding and conflict, but the greater flexibility demonstrated by the Bolivian government, coca growers, and the U.S. Embassy has provided a viable short term solution to the present conflict and much-needed breathing space to seek enduring proposals and strategies.
In spite of this new agreement, and although President Mesa has called for a complete investigation of human rights violations during the conflicts, prospects for transparent legal processes in the civilian court system as stipulated by Bolivian and international law appear grim.
The roots of the September conflict
After ten months without protracted confrontations in the Chapare coca-growing region, clashes resumed between the Joint Task Force, the combined military and police eradication unit. A September 12 coca growers’ assembly determined to renew vigils around eradication camps and coca fields slated for elimination in an attempt to impede the entrance of the Joint Task Force into the region.
Proposed reform of failed alternative development programs slow
The decision to renew resistance to forced eradication arose partially in response to what growers perceived as the Bolivian government's incompliance with a May 15th agreement to redesign largely ineffectual alternative development programs. The terms of the accord emphasize integrated sustainable focus and local participation in planning and implementation of projects channeled through Chapare municipalities. Another clause stipulated "the national government promises to negotiate the study and formulation of a strategic development plan for the Cochabamba tropics (Chapare) with the Municipal organization of the region for the amount of 20 million dollars in its initial phase." Coca growers interpret this vague wording as a government agreement to transfer alternative development resources to the municipal umbrella organization and protested delays in disbursement.
Reforms to existing alternative development programs came as a result of U.S. willingness to improve the programs it funds. In March 2004 U.S. ambassador David Greenlee announced that USAID was willing to accept a more participatory approach and work with Chapare municipalities. In the past the U.S. government had only participated in limited projects with these local governments controlled by coca growers. Although USAID, U.S. Embassy and DOS state officials confirm the new focus of project planning and implementation through Chapare municipal governments, they never envisioned or authorized a direct transfer of funds.
The new participatory approach is clearly a positive step and responds to long-term coca grower demands and experts’ and advocates’ recommendations. It remains to be seen, though, how these efforts will be implemented. Coca growers continue protest that USAID salary and overhead expenses are as high as 82%, limiting the funds available to directly benefit Chapare farmers. As Villa Tunari Mayor Felipe Cáceres explained, "after two terms running a local government, we know that it is possible to carry out a project for one third of what USAID says it spends to do the same thing. We don’t pay for all those expense consultants." In spite of these denunciations, USAID has rehired the Development Alternatives, Inc. to carry out the new strategy, in spite of denunciations of mismanagement, conflict of interest and poor performance. The continue participation of these contractors and other firms threaten to maintain costs high and limit results.
Legal coca market study stalled
Coca growers also protested that the Bolivian government has not made progress on the legal coca market study it agreed to conduct in the same agreement. Currently Anti-drug Law 1008 permits 12,000 hectares of coca production for traditional use, the great majority of which is grown in the Yungas region near La Paz. Coca growers and advocates protest that the amount of coca needed for legal consumption is much greater. In the past, U.S. Embassy officials claimed that traditional use could be satisfied with less than half that quantity, using studies that they funded as evidence. The credibility of this research has been widely questioned, though, and one U.S. Embassy representative admitted that the 12,000-hectare figure was just a "guesstimate." Although both the Bolivian government and coca grower representatives had agreed that the study should be carried out "as soon as possible," the impartial organization had not been chosen to carry out the research and its methodology remains undefined.
Five-year drug control plan similar to Plan Dignidad
The announcement of the Mesa administration's new five-year anti-drug plan, The Comprehensive Bolivian Strategy to fight Drug Trafficking: 2004-2008, further heightened tensions. Although the Bolivian government has promoted the plan as a new development-centered effort, and affirmed that the strategy would work to eliminate the economic marginalization of coca growers, the design and the needed budget are similar to that of Plan Dignidad (1998- 2002), which generated widespread protest and repression in the Chapare. For example, the Bolivian Executive Branch approved both strategies, without a congressional vote the norm for Bolivian drug policy after the 1988 congressional approval of anti-drug Law 1008. Bolivian drug policy has traditionally circumvented legislative approval to ensure that U.S. objectives are met to maintain much-needed funding. In addition, both plans contain the same pillars: eradication, alternative development, interdiction and prevention. Both strategies include high budgets for alternative development (Mesa: 557 million; Dignity: 700 million) and lesser amounts for eradication. In spite of this apparently favorable distribution of funds, critics fear that the Mesa strategy could end up focusing most on eradication, as did the previous plan, echoing U.S. government priorities and funding. As U.S. Ambassador Donna Hrinak explained in 1998, "We fund the things no one else wants to– eradication and the military. Other donors can cover other needs."
Unfortunately, other nations did not cover the ambitious development budget of Plan Dignity, and the $85 million provided by the US in 2000 did not generate significant income for Chapare farmers. In most cases, viable alternative development efforts to replace income lost from coca did not accompany well-funded accelerated eradication efforts, and coca growers rapidly replanted the leaf to ensure their survival. Although the current government’s strategy voluntary eradication with economic compensation in the Yungas region to eliminate an estimated 11,000 excess hectares of coca, union leaders in that region promise to fiercely resist its implementation. Yungas leader and MAS congressman Dionisio Nunez affirmed, "Carlos Mesa’s anti-drug plan responds to the United States’ imposition that seeks to eliminate the Yungas coca grower movement and all coca." And referred to integral development in exchange for eradication as "blackmail." (Los Tiempos 9/9/04).
In spite of the Mesa administration’s good intentions, the similarities to the Dignity Plan and U.S. pressure to maintain eradication may open old wounds. The failure to obtain needed development funds and the inability to destine them in productive directions has the potential to generate further conflict in both the Chapare and Yungas coca growing regions.
Press statements that both Bolivian officials and international donors were alarmed by the increase in coca production in the Chapare increased public skepticism about the new strategy (Los Tiempos 9/11/04). Although these same officials admitted that "zero coca," a stated goal of the first Sánchez de Lozada and Banzer governments, is impossible to achieve. Simultaneously the Joint Task Force began to accelerate eradication missions, citing U.S. Pressure to meet eradication quotas.
These factors, combined with continued impunity for past human rights violation in the region and continued prosecution of coca grower leaders on poorly-substantiated narco-terrorism charges led to renewed protests in the Chapare. Security forces in the region responded with excessive use of force, leading to the death of one coca grower and the injury of others.
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