History of a Failed War 

In 1986 President Reagan declared war on drugs by citing drug trafficking a threat to US national security. Three years later the Bush administration followed suit by calling for an "assault on every front" that would reduce cocaine imports to the US 60% by 1996. His Andean Initiative allocated $2.2 billion for a five year period to fight cocaine trafficking at the source where coca, the primary material, is grown.

US policy makers cited three foreign policy objectives for Bolivia: 1) strengthening democracy, 2) encouraging sustained economic growth and stability, and 3) fighting the "War on Drugs." To date, the third objective has dominated US efforts at the expense of the first two.1

President Clinton, in words at least, attempted to shift the focus of US drug policy to "democratic institution building."  However, in practice, he has followed in the footsteps of his predecessors with a supply side strategy that targets the sources of production with emphasis on eradication of coca fields and interdiction.2 66.5% of the 1997 budget for international drug control programs was for law enforcement and military support. Yet the flow of cocaine has not noticeably decreased.

The US often cites a lack of political will on the part of the Bolivian government as the reason for the poor results in the drug war. In reality, the Bolivian government has often found itself caught between the demands of the "War on Drugs" and domestic politics. Usually US demands win out, often violating human rights as well as Bolivia's national sovereignty. The US wields tremendous power through tools of aid, trade and debt. Over the past ten years Bolivia has received an average of about $175 million a year from the US. For Bolivia, a country with few sources of income and a debt of over $4 billion, this assistance is desperately needed.

Human Rights Violations

For more than a decade, victims of the "War on Drugs," especially in the main coca growing area of the Chapare, have experienced harassment and abuse, frequent torture and rape and even murder at the hands of the US backed and funded anti-narcotics police. The following characteristics of this war create an environment that encourages human right violations:

First, the UMOPAR, the Bolivian counter-narcotics force, focuses training on military jungle operations and actions against drug traffickers. Little attention is given to police activities, crowd control and other skills that would protect peasants from abuse and misuse of US supplied weapons and riot control agents.

Second, the tremendous US political pressure on the Bolivian government to meet the yearly coca eradication deadlines pushes human rights concerns to the bottom of the list of priorities for Bolivian anti-narcotics forces.

Third, the UMOPAR and other police units operate under conditions of total impunity. Charges of human rights violations against them are ignored. Even cases of serious abuse, such as torture and murder are rarely investigated or, if so, the investigation is done in a superficial manner that never incriminates individual officers.3 The Andean Information Network and other organizations who monitor human rights have repeatedly challenged the US Embassy to take a leadership role in the investigation of abuses. To this date, responses have been limited to denials that violations exist.

If just one investigation would produce a conviction, it would set a precedent for change in the appalling state of human rights in Bolivia. However, due to the US and Bolivian governments' attitudes that in this war the ends justify the means, the anti-drug forces continue to condemn the population of the Chapare to a life of abuse.

The Five-Year Plan (Plan Dignity)

The coca farmers of the Chapare region have been on pins and needles awaiting the implementation of the government's Five Year Plan. This plan calls for the elimination of all illegal coca plantations by the year 2002 (illegal coca is any coca cultivated over and above the 13,000 hectares of coca legally designated for domestic usage, such as teas and medicines). The plan includes four pillars:

alternative development ($700 million)

prevention and rehabilitation ($15 million)

eradication ($108 million)

interdiction ($129 million)

The total price tag is $952 million, of which $791 million will have to be provided by the international community over the next five years. To date the eradication pillar has been the most heavily emphasized by officials in both the United States and Bolivia. At its core is a gradual transition away from providing compensation to farmers for the coca plants they eradicate. This process involves moving from individual to community compensation, then, within five years, to the complete elimination of compensation. It is difficult to argue that eradication programs have been successful. Using the figures from the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCURS) for Bolivia, one can calculate that between 1996 and 1997, for each hectare of coca eradicated, .63 hectares were replanted–not exactly the success story officials would like to tell.

The elimination of individual compensation has a high price for the farmers of the Chapare. Coca farmers were never consulted in the formulation of a new system of compensation and their reaction has been fear and distrust. They fear that they will have to completely eliminate the only crop that gives them a steady income without the security of a marketable replacement crop. And they believe that the compensation money they once used for starting up another income source will instead be diverted to the government's alternative development fund, leaving the individual farmer without a means to provide for his family. The government has done nothing to dispel these fears, and no new alternative crop programs are in the offing.

The residents of Chapare are also frightened by Section 4.4 (d) of the Plan, which calls for the relocation of 5,000 families to other zones of the country. To date the government has yet to define either how or where these families will be moved, though it recently announced that there is a possibility the community compensation plan would provide the finances necessary to move the families. Relocation has been firmly rejected by the coca growers' union, as well as by the municipal leaders of the suggested zones of relocation such as Santa Cruz. AIN believes that the forced relocation of families is in violation of the international
human rights treaties to which Bolivia is a party.

Criticism

Since the announcement of the Five Year Plan, many sectors of Bolivian society have criticized its contents. Government representatives claim that the Five Year Plan is based on the National Dialogue, a series of roundtable discussions that took part in late 1997. However, participants in the National Dialogue say the conclusions reached in the plenary on narcotrafficking are not reflected in the document and that contributions to the dialogue were used selectively and opportunistically to support the government's prejudices. The coca growers were systematically excluded from the dialogue, signifying that the plan is a far cry from the reflection of national consensus that the government claims.

The Five Year Plan has never been debated or approved by the National Congress. Antonio Araníbar, Minister of Foreign Relations under the previous government, says that the plan jeopardizes Bolivia's democracy and social stability for goals that are unreachable. He adds that the government's implementation of this plan is destined to end in violence, causing human rights violations and the militarization of the Chapare.

Additional criticisms label the plan both unrealistic in its call for the eradication of all coca within five years and irresponsible for not taking into account the drastic economic impact of the intended elimination of coca, as the drug trade, though illegal, is a major contributor to the Bolivian economy. The plan has also been critiqued for focusing almost entirely on the coca growers, while putting too little emphasis on narcotraffickers and money laundering. The heavy focus on the coca growers has manifested itself in extensive forced eradication, which in turn causes violence.

Forced Eradication

Since April 14, the military, UMOPAR (Mobile Rural Patrol Units), the Ecological Police and agents from DIRECO, the organization that oversees eradication efforts, have been forcibly eradicating coca in many sectors of Chapare. Under Law 1008, Bolivia's infamous antinarcotics law, this eradication is illegal. The law states that the coca in this zone is transitional and must be eradicated voluntarily, with both compensation and crop substitution. This strategy of forced eradication causes further erosion of confidence in the government and generates even more social tension, making it difficult to reach accords.

In response to the continued forced eradication, the coca growers' unions have reorganized their self-defense committees. These committees — armed with sticks and stones — physically block the entrance to growing areas in order to avoid eradication. On June 1, these committees blocked the entrance into the Isiboro Securé Park, demanding that the forced eradication stop and the zone be demilitarized. To date, five people have been killed in acts of resistance, including two policemen, Andrés Achá and Pedro Doming Torres Franco.

Approximately 2,414 hectares have been eradicated since the first of the year. The government is selectively compensating by signing eradication agreements with individual farmers. This is a strategicpolicy designed to divide the farmers from their union leadership. Dozens of poor coca farmers also face hardships, like hunger or even starvation, as a result of this policy. The case of Felipa Mamani is one such example: Two years ago, she lost her right leg from a bullet wound in a confrontation with UMOPAR police; on April 27 of this year, her one hectare of coca, as well as her food crops, were eradicated in Villa Victoria. She faces starvation this winter if she does not receive some type of financial compensation for her losses.

Militarization of the Tropics of Cochabamba

Since April 4, the Bolivian military has been active in the area, not only maintaining social order, but also eradicating coca fields.  This constitutes a new role for the military, which previously has been constitutionally restricted to protecting borders and providing labor for community projects. On May 8, the government announced that the Armed Forces High Command would be moved to Cochabamba for geopolitical reasons. Although the government denies that its reasons are based on a desire to increase military presence in the Chapare, Guido Nayar, Minister of Government, has publicly stated that the military will remain in the zone for the next five years. This is, in fact, a clear signal of a continued role for the military in the zone.

There are an estimated 5,000 troops in the area consisting of conscripts from CIIOS II, the Seventh Division of Cochabamba and the Eighth Division of Santa Cruz. According to eye-witnesses in the area, the majority of the soldiers are young farmers (16 to 18 years of age) lacking the experience necessary for diffusing face-to-face confrontations or for the severe living conditions of the tropics. One resident of the area testified to a member of AIN that when she begged soldiers not to eradicate her coca, a number of them started to cry. Additionally, observers question whether the soldiers have sufficient rations, as they have stolen not only agricultural crops, such as oranges, but also chickens and other livestock. Many times they eat the stolen fruit right in front of the owners. It is obvious that these young soldiers are not trained or prepared for the activities they are ordered to carry out. This is a step back for human rights in the area and has led to a sharp increase in violent confrontations.

U.S. antinarcotics assistance to security forces is conditioned on human rights practices under the Leahy amendment in the law appropriating foreign aid for fiscal year 1998. This amendment stipulates that no antinarcotics assistance can be "provided to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible evidence to believe such unit has committed gross violations of human rights unless the Secretary determines…that the government of such country is taking steps to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice."

1 "Bolivia–Human Rights Violations and the War on Drugs." Human Rights Watch/Americas. Vol.7, No. 8, p.9. July, 1995.

2. Youngers, Coletta. "The Andean Quagmire: Rethinking US Drug Congrol Efforts in the Andes." Fueling Failure: US International Drug Control Policy. Washington DC. Washington Office on Latin America. March, 1996.

3 "Bolivia Under Pressure." Human Right Watch/Americas. Vol. 8, No 4 (b), p. 9 May, 1996