The Leahy Amendment is a law passed in 1997 that prohibits U.S. funding of security forces whose members have been credibly implicated in human rights violations, stating:
None of the funds made available by this Act may be provided to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that such unit has committed gross violations of human rights, unless the Secretary determines and reports to the Committees on Appropriations that the government of such country is taking effective measures to bring the responsible member of the security forces unit to justice.
While this law should be used to promote an end to the impunity enjoyed by security forces, it has yet to be implemented in Bolivia. Human rights organizations have repeatedly presented considerable documentation constituting “credible evidence” of violations, including photographs, eyewitness testimony, and Bolivian government medical certificates. Additionally, security force members responsible for human rights violations are not effectively brought to justice. Nevertheless, the U.S. government has yet to withhold funds as the Leahy amendment dictates.
In addition to having committed well-documented human rights violations, the Bolivian security forces try these cases in military tribunals, if they address them at all. This violates Bolivian law and international accords, to which Bolivia is party, that determine that cases of security forces involved in human rights violations must be tried in the civilian court system. The U.S. State Department admitted that these tribunals are ineffective, reporting that the “military justice system generally was susceptible to senior-level influence and corruption and avoided rulings that would embarrass the military.”1 In addition, in one key case the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency has observed that “the [military] tribunal’s findings appear to simply rubberstamp and thereby vindicate the military’s own version of what occurred.”2 As of August 2004, no member of the security forces has ever received serious legal consequences for committing human rights violations. At most, the military tribunals issue symbolic internal disciplinary measures.
The U.S. embassy consults a variety of sources when looking into human rights cases, but frequently adopts the Bolivian security forces’ version without further investigation. This is not sufficient for an effective evaluation of security forces’ compliance with the stipulations of the Leahy amendment. In 1995 Human Rights Watch noted the problem: “U.S. officials dismiss or downplay abuses by U.S.-supported counternarcotics forces” and “make excuses for or attempt to justify human rights violations.”3
The 2001 killing of coca-grower union-leader Casimiro Huanca during peaceful protests clearly demonstrates the shortcomings of U.S. investigations and excuses made for abuses committed by the forces they fund. Video footage clearly shows excessive use of force and eyewitness testimony reported that U.S.-funded Expeditionary Task Force member Juan Eladio Bora shot Huanca, who later died. Within two weeks of the incident, the military tribunal determined that Bora shot Huanca in self-defense, despite the video footage showing the peaceful nature of the protest.4 Military judicial investigators only obtained statements from military personnel involved in the incident, and did not question coca growers or other eyewitnesses.5 The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency contradicted the military tribunal report, asserting:
…the video tape is clear enough to show that the military’s version of the events of 2001-12-06 is inaccurate at best and a complete fabrication at worst. This videotape could be used by military and medical personnel as an excellent example of “what not to do” in terms of crowd control, military discipline and medical care.6
Nevertheless, the State Department used the military version of the events to present members of the U.S. Congress with an explanation of the incident, claiming that coca growers had blocked the road and the ETF had acted in self-defense. Furthermore, one State Department official contended that Huanca’s death did not constitute a gross human rights violation because he did not die from being shot, but had bled to death. He suggested that Huanca might have survived had he received adequate medical attention, neglecting to mention the absence of adequate medical facilities in the region. This case is a prime example of the U.S. government’s biased interpretation of human rights violations and its manipulation of facts to avoid conclusions that would warrant implementation of the Leahy amendment.
The U.S. has further skirted the issue. Embassy and State Department officials have claimed that they lack sufficient staff and budget to determine whether gross human rights violations have been committed, despite the extensive documentation human rights monitors have provided them.7 They contend that they cannot get the medical certificates and autopsy reports they need to accurately assess if credible evidence of violations exists. Yet, the U.S. provides the funding and administrative support for the Ministry of Justice Human Rights Office that produces these certificates. The embassy appears to avoid certain evidence and conclusions, so as to produce results that evade Leahy stipulations.
While the U.S. embassy strategically avoids invoking the Leahy Law to push for prosecution of human rights violations, the U.S. Congress has strengthened its formal discourse of respect for human rights. In January 2004, Congress conditioned FY2004 funds for the Bolivian military and police on a determination by the Secretary of State that these forces “are respecting human rights and cooperating with investigations and prosecutions of alleged violations of human rights.”8 Nevertheless, funds continue to be disbursed, despite a U.S. State Department report noting:
“some members of the security forces committed serious human rights abuses… Security forces killed dozens and injured hundreds of protestors during episodes of violent social unrest… There were credible reports of abuses by security forces, including use of excessive force, extortion, and improper arrests… The Governments delay in completing effective investigations and identifying and punishing those responsible for either civilian or security force deaths resulted in a perception of impunity.”9
In conclusion, while the Leahy amendment provides the legal framework for the U.S. to pressure Bolivian security forces to respect human rights and to aggressively prosecute violators, the U.S. government has failed to take advantage of this. By downplaying violations and endorsing poorly investigated, and often inaccurate, military reports, the U.S. embassy is promoting impunity in Bolivia and circumventing the spirit of the law. Congress has ignored these critiques, along with more than ten U.S. congressional letters of inquiry pressing for implementation of the Leahy amendment in Bolivia. The U.S. embassy continues to downplay even the most serious abuses, even though a few successful prosecutions of well-documented cases would most likely increase the legitimacy of both the Bolivian and the U.S. governments, in turn furthering U.S. counternarcotics goals. As long as the U.S. government chooses to stubbornly place antidrug objectives over respect for human rights, impunity will continue and the human rights climate will further deteriorate. However, implementation of the Leahy amendment would improve the situation in Bolivia, from both a human rights and a War on Drugs perspective.
1 U.S. Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2003. 25 Feb 2004.
2 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency Memo, Document I.D. number 189695174, 28 Dec 2001.
3 “Bolivia: Human Rights Violations and the War on Drugs.” Human Rights Watch, Vol. 7. No. 8. July 1995. 2.
4 “EN PROCESO DE PARAMILITARIZACIÓN Las Fuerzas Armadas han perdido el control.” Pulso. 17 Dec 2001.
5 AIN interview with witnesses in the Casimiro Huanca case, 16 Jan 2002.
6 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency Memo, Document I.D. number 189636551, 20 Dec 2001.
7 AIN/WOLA meeting at the U.S. Embassy in La Paz, 19 Nov 2002. Present were the chargé d’affaires, a political officer, and representatives of Milgroup, USAID, three WOLA staffmembers, and the AIN director.
8 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2004 (P.L. 108-199, Division D, Title V).
9 U.S. Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2003. 25 Feb 2004