Certification Process Conditions Economic Assistance
Beginning in 1986, the U.S. government implemented a certification process, in which access to loans and grants became dependent upon the executive branch’s yearly determination of a country’s compliance with U.S. counterdrug objectives. Countries that were deemed “significant direct or indirect sources” of illicit drugs “significantly affecting the United States” had to be “certified” by the President each year. In 2002, Congress modified the process. The U.S. executive no longer issues a yearly certification, but may still decertify countries that have “failed demonstrably” to meet U.S. antinarcotics goals. Decertification can result in sanctions, a reduction or elimination of U.S. aid (except for humanitarian and drug-related aid), a potential U.S. veto on loans from international lending agencies, and possible exclusion for U.S.-sponsored free trade agreements or favored tariff treatment. However, if the Administration deems decertification, and the subsequent cut-off of aid to a country, as a potential threat to vital U.S. interests, the President may invoke a “national interest” waiver to justify continuing funding. The U.S. certification process involves thirty-one countries around the world, twelve of which are in Latin American, including, Colombia, Peru, Paraguay, and Bolivia.
Bolivia’s Dependence on U.S. Aid
Bolivia is extremely dependent upon financial aid from the United States and international lenders, such as the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. Foreign aid from the U.S. alone totaled almost $171 million in 2003.1 In 1993, during his first administration, President Sánchez de Lozada complained, “the dependency is terrible; the International Monetary Fund comes, the United States Embassy comes, the World Bank comes, and they all tell us what to do.”2 This dependency persists, as in March 2004 President Carlos Mesa admitted, “we are addicts and dependent on international cooperation.”3
Because of Bolivia’s heavy reliance on international funding and the U.S. conditioning of this aid, there is tremendous pressure to produce numbers demonstrating success in the drug war. U.S. and Bolivian officials use the amount of drugs seized, hectares of coca eradicated, and numbers of drug-related arrests to demonstrate “success.” Additionally, success is based on arrest statistics, rather than number of convictions, resulting in numerous illegal detentions. Pressure to meet eradication goals has systematically led to human rights violations. Eradication forces’ focus on meeting U.S.-mandated objectives supercedes respect for human rights. Additionally, virtually no attention is given to the social and economic consequences of eradication for coca growers. When cocaleros protest the destruction of their coca crops, which is frequently their livelihood, violent confrontations result and soldiers resort to excessive force to remain on schedule to meet U.S. requirements.
U.S. Pressure for Forced Eradication Generates Human Rights Abuses
While drug interdiction was the centerpiece of early U.S.-funded counternarcotics programs, increasing emphasis on the eradication of coca crops has become the focus since the mid-1990s. Historically, Bolivian government officials complied with minimum eradication goals to earn U.S. certification in order to maintain funding and access to international aid. Authorities typically stepped up efforts just prior to the certification deadline, with corresponding increases in violent confrontations between coca growers and eradication forces. However, the 1998 implementation of Plan Dignidad marked the Bolivian government’s abandonment of efforts to balance U.S. antidrug requirements with the needs and demands of the coca growers. In hopes of gaining substantial economic rewards in the form of increased foreign aid, the Banzer administration designed a plan to exceed U.S. antidrug requirements. The anticipated funding, expected to replace the jobs and income lost with coca eradication, was not delivered and the eradication successes only served to increase U.S. antidrug expectations. Moreover, escalating series of confrontations resulted in numerous human rights violations, as pressure to meet eradication goals continued to take precedence over respect for human rights.
Plan Dignidad serves as a prime example of the influence the U.S. government wields and the impact it can have in Bolivia. The following administration of Sánchez de Lozada continued the same strategies, focusing on forced eradication about all. In mid-2004 President Carlos Mesa announced a new five-year antidrug strategy, requiring $957 million. This plan, like Plan Dignidad, promotes the four pillars of eradication, interdiction, alternative development, and rehabilitation. Mesa has proposed that 58.2% of the funding go to alternative development. Nevertheless, as 90% of the total budget must come from international aid, the U.S. will no doubt continue to use its political and economic leverage to shape Bolivian antidrug policy and perpetuate the historic focus on eradication, with little regard for the social costs and the sacrifice of Bolivian sovereignty. In spite of U.S. rhetoric that includes respect for human rights as a priority in the drug war, antidrug policy in Bolivia continues to be dominated by U.S.-imposed strategies that cultivate conflict and violence. As Waldo Albarracín, then-president of the Permanent Human Rights Assembly, told the press in March 2001, the United States “talks about human rights and pressures the Bolivian state to carry out forced eradication, which is a synonym for violence, death, murdered campesinos, and tortured soldiers and police officers. They put up the funds and we offer up the dead.”4 Because Bolivia is so dependent upon U.S. funding, and the United States conditions that funding on their own drug control objectives, Bolivian antidrug policy continues to be determined abroad, with negative effects for Bolivia and its people.
1 U.S. FY 2005 Budget Request. Congressional Budget Justification For Foreign Operations, Western Hemisphere. p. 6. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/28980.pdf
2 Presencia, 9 April 1994. Cited in “La enigma boliviana: Bilateralizar la agenda Bilateral” Democracias Bajo Fuego. Transnational Institute, 1998. p 291.
3 Opinión, 17 March 2004. “Mesa emplaza a los Bolivianos a cambiar de mentalidad.”
4 Los Tiempos, “EE.UU. ahora deplora a las violaciones de DD.HH,” 5 March 2002