A more pragmatic perspective from within Bolivia

Comments provided by George Gray Molina during a presentation at the Inter-American Dialogue do a great deal more to place current polarization and cycles of conflict into perspective and help outsiders understand complex power struggles within Bolivia.  Gray Molina’s presentation presents the underlying historical situation and the structural problems that complicate Bolivian politics, instead of emphasizing current tensions as a phenomenon of the MAS administration. He highlights that dialogue on explosive issues appears improbably in the near future, and that consensus on prioritizing strengthening institutions, through filling vacancies in the Constitutional Tribunal and other organisms.  You can read an analysis of his commentary here or download the full paper here .

Recommendations give clear advantage to opposition instead of creating a level playing field for dialogue:

•  The Crisis Group erroneously identifies the Recall and Constitutional initiatives as “duelling referendums’ aimed at subduing the other side.”  Clearly, the constitutional referendum is a MAS initiative, but the recall vote, although ultimately pushed through the opposition controlled senate by PODEMOS (opposition) senators, has generated staunch opposition from regional elites.  Although the report accurately highlights that recall results will most likely not change the political panorama, the probable confirmation of Morales’s mandate paired with the potential defeat of one or more opposition prefects would strengthen the administration’s position.  The report’s recommendation to hold “off on the final adoption of the new constitution and the referendum on recall of elected public officials,” would be interpreted by the Bolivian right and embolden them to further pressure the Morales administration, firmly entrenched in their positions and with as little predisposition to dialogue as they currently demonstrate.  In turn, this perceived retreat would put government officials in a defensive stance, not at all conducive to compromise.

•  The suggestion that “the government should provisionally stop taking IDH money away from the departments to finance its new pension fund,” would also represent a significant concession for the Morales administration, and would be perceived as a weakness by regional elites. Furthermore, it is unclear how both departmental budgets would deal with the funding flux or how the central government would continue to distribute the sorely needed pensions to the nation’s elderly.  It is important to note that MAS failed to publicly make convincing arguments for the shifts of these funds back into the national treasury, heightening tensions with departmental governments, although these arguments do exist. (See “Bolivia’s Gas Nationalization: Opportunities and Challenges (2).”) In spite of this, it is not realistic or practical at this time for either party to turn back the clock.

•  The report overestimates the weight of the demand to transfer the nation’s capital, or part of it, back to Sucre as a key recurring issue in the conflict.   The highly unfeasible regional demand from Sucrenses was temporarily catalyzed by opposition regional government and political actors as a strategy to impede progress in the assembly and redraw the debate along regional, not politically partisan, lines, but has been abandoned by all parties.   Many analysts concur that MAS could have successfully diffused the momentum of the initiative by accepting its inclusion in the Constitutional Assembly proceedings, where it most likely would have been defeated.  This strategic error permitted the inflation of this issue beyond all practical proportions. 

  The recent confrontations within Sucre centered on urban outrage for a lack of investigation for the deaths in November 2007, general opposition to the Morales administration and the desire to have him “apologize” for perceived offenses, and a campaign to elect an opposition prefect to replace the MAS prefect that resigned as a result of the conflict.  Lowland and other anti-MAS civic and departmental officials have dropped the demand from their agendas, which now focus on mobilizing opposition to Morales through autonomy campaigns. Although they may later resurrect the issue in an attempt to generate friction, genuine demands for a shift of the capital never extended beyond the Sucre Department. Furthermore, as a result of the racist incidents there in May 2008, it is doubtful that rural, primarily indigenous Sucrenses would support any initiative that would strengthen the position of city civic leaders.

  The most concrete means to address this demand, which would go beyond a historical issue of regional pride, would be for the central government to promote  significant economic development and job generation, issues at the root of this demand by Sucre residents. 

•   The suggestion that “the autonomy question is top priority and must be tackled immediately” once again allows regional elites to define priorities in the national agenda. Although it is an important point of friction, the primary concern of the bulk of the population is economic security and inflation in the prices of staples and foodstuffs. In essence the autonomy referendums, beyond their genuine desire for greater regional powers are also designed to derail the Morales administrations’ agenda of economic reform and attacking poverty, which face other significant internal and external impediments.

    The remaining recommendations for dialogue and conflict resolution are positive, but unattainable and unrealistic, both as a result of the     suggested actions detailed above and the existing polarization.

Other specific comments:

• Although the detailed description of procedural corners cut during the approval of the pending constitutional draft may be in part because of the great deal of research the Crisis Group carried out for a previous report, the comparatively brief and descriptive section presented on the Autonomy referendums fails to highlight procedural concerns and legal liberties taken within these highly questionable initiatives. It is surprising that the Crisis Group only provides this brief summary for what it identities as Bolivia’s “top priority.” For example, the report mentions that Santa Cruz “began to implement its autonomy statutes by convening its new departmental legislature.” It is important to note that the prefectural government merely changed the name of its departmental council, appointed by different municipalities in the region, and gave it a legislative mandate, a highly irregular and undemocratic move.  For further information on legal and procedural violations in the approval of the autonomy statutes see AIN’s “Illegal Autonomy Referendum Deepens Divisions in Bolivia."

• The report asserts that “As part of its strategy to ensure quick adoption of the constitution, MAS also exploited a legal loophole” (p. 4) in the August 2007 Law extending Assembly proceedings. The supposed “loophole,” the requirement for a settlement referendum for draft articles that failed to obtain a 2/3 majority in the assembly, was not a MAS manipulation, but a key demand from PODEMOS representatives which MAS accepted during deliberations of the extension bill.  It is true that MAS was able to sidestep heated debates on the agrarian reform issue by allowing it to pass as a popular vote, but it did so in compliance with guidelines drafted by the opposition.

• The report erroneously claims that, “under the new constitution, prefects are to be appointed by the president,” (p. 4) as part of Morales administration initiative to decentralize power within the departments.  In truth, the new constitutional draft guarantees the direct election of the prefects (See Article 275: “In the decentralized departments the election of prefects and departmental council members will occur through universal suffrage….” Article 286 further stipulates conditions for candidates and their election, “…The mandate of the prefect is five years; they can be re-elected consecutively only once.”

 End Part I