Much like U.S. tribunals, Bolivian military court proceedings lack transparency, the selection process of judges depends on the military high command, and does not require that all officials have legal training. The tribunal acts as both judge and jury. Furthermore, human rights advocates have consistently critiqued the Bolivian military justice tribunal for quick acquittals for military personnel in human rights cases, although Bolivian law and international human rights accords clearly stipulate that these cases correspond to the civilian legal system. Military trials for civilian and retired military defendants in the current case would clearly violate Bolivian law and military codes1 and send the wrong message from any reform government.
There does not appear to be consensus within the Morales administration about the proposal. In 2002, current Minister of the Presidency harshly criticized the military tribunal’s performance:
“Historically, the Military Tribunal has been a tool to cover up the irregularities committed within and outside the armed forces, particularly within them….an apocryphal mediocre and incompetent legal machinery made up of people who have debt with that same military justice system, and as a result they don’t have moral authority to judge any type of crime ….So the military court is basically a tool to cover up and drag out legal processes against officers that have committed human rights violations….As a result, the trials are just a simulation to give the appearance that justice is being administered within the armed forces….It’s a sham; no one believes in the military justice system. 2 He continued that the effort to modernize military law as “a sterile project that “merely attempts to incorporate two or three changes to show that they are making the armed forces more democratic.“
In addition, the current president of the Military Tribunal discounted an earlier suggestion by Morales that retired military officers implicated in the case should be tried in his court. He explained, “"In order for a current or retired member of the armed forces to be tried in military court, they would have had to commit the crime during active service, as stipulated by the military code.” He stated that the ex-military personnel accused should be tried in the civilian court system.3 In spite of this statement Morales reiterated his request on May 28, “If the armed forces’ institutional norms, if the Military Justice Tribunal permits punishing these commanders, for their participation in separatist and terrorist groups, it is important to try them (there)." 4
Bolivian Legal Norms Prohibit Military Trials for Civilians
1) Article 48 of the Bolivian criminal procedures code states civilians can never be submitted to military jurisdiction. When there is doubt about which jurisdiction is appropriate, the case must be handled within the civilian system.5
2) The new constitution states: The legal jurisdiction will not recognize special legal codes, privileges or special tribunals. Military courts will judge military crimes regulated by law.6
3) “Military personnel in active service and civilian Employees of the armed forces are subject to military jurisdiction,” according to the military penal code.7
Unfortunately, military law also contains some stipulations that are internally contradictory or contradict the Bolivian constitution.8 For example the Military Penal code, passed as a Supreme Decree in 1976 stipulates the death penalty by firing squad for treason.9 Although, no special code such as military law takes precedence over the nation’s constitution, which forbids the death penalty,10 these contradictory norms would provoke further conflict. At this time, the Constitutional Tribunal, the judicial body which would have to formally revoke the contradictory stipulations of military law, is not functioning.
Human Rights Difficulties with Bolivia’s Military Tribunal
The civilian justice system’s inefficiency and inefficacy have been used to justify holding human rights trials in military courts since 2001. However, stipulations in the Bolivian Constitution and in international law dictate that such cases should be tried in civilian courts.11 Although the scale of human rights violations committed by the military has diminished since 2004, unfortunately this practice continued through 2008.
Military personnel have refused to cooperate in investigations carried out by the attorney general’s representatives, asserting that they are answerable only to internal military investigations. In any case, there are no laws that provide for transparency in military court proceedings, and none of the human rights cases that have gone to the military court has resulted in a conviction. Furthermore, military commanders have used quick acquittals in their tribunal to block prosecution in the civilian courts, arguing double jeopardy. Although some military commanders state that military jurisdiction in human rights cases is essential to protect the institution, a 1998 study revealed that many members of the armed forces lacked faith in military courts’ decisions and operations. For example, 88 percent of members surveyed felt that the military court was not at all or not very impartial. 95 percent stated that the court was not at all modern or not sufficiently modern, and 86 percent believed that the military justice authorities were not sufficiently competent or were completely incompetent.12 This vote of no confidence from members of the armed forces themselves further calls into question the legitimacy of the system. The armed forces declined to publicly release the findings of a follow-up study.13
The Wrong Message During Crisis
At a time of uncertainty it is advisable to strengthen the existing civilian legal investigations. Considering bending Bolivian law, including the new constitution, to transfer the case to military courts would serve to further undermine and already complicated and obstacle-ridden civilian inquiry. Furthermore, the creation of an additional role, without any legal foundation, for an apparently reticent military tribunal, would certainly heighten tensions within the nation, and between the Morales administration and the armed forces. Contrary to the decision made by the Bush administration, and to an extent, the Obama administration, investigations and legal consequences for alleged acts of terrorism or treason must be carried out with transparency, following established due process norms and legal stipulations within the context of the existing civilian judicial system.
1 For more information on the use of military tribunals to guarantee impunity:
2 AIN/WOLA interview with Juan Ramón Quintana, Nov 18 2002.
3 “Justicia Militar no tiene atribución para juzgar a ex militares en afanes secesionistas.” ABI 25 May, 2009.
4 “Morales pide escarmiento para ex comandantes de FFAA involucrados en terrorismo y secesión.” ABI 28 May 2009.
5 Artículo 48º. (Jurisdicción ordinaria y especial). “En caso de duda sobre la jurisdicción aplicable, por razones de concurrencia o conexitud entre la jurisdicción especial y la ordinaria, corresponderá el conocimiento de los delitos a la ordinaria. En ningún caso los civiles serán sometidos a la jurisdicción militar.” LEY N 1970,LEY DE 25 DE MARZO DE 1999. CODIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTO PENAL de Bolivia.
6 Art. 180, III. La jurisdicción ordinaria no reconocerá fueros, privilegios ni tribunales de excepción. La jurisdicción militar juzgará los delitos de naturaleza militar regulados por la ley. Nueva Constitución Política del Estado. Congreso Nacional de Bolivia. October 2008.
7 Note that the second clause of this article violates the Criminal Procedures Code. Article 12 . Ley de Organización de la Justicia militar: “Están sujetos a la jurisdicción castrense, los militares en servicio activo y empleados civiles dependientes de la Institución Armada. que, en el momento del hecho, tengan más de 16 años de edad Decreto Ley No. 13321 de 22 de enero de 1976
8 For example, the military code also stipulates that 2) los delitos cometidos por nacionales y extranjeros que, sin ser miembros de las Fuerzas Armadas, afecten materias y lugares militares.
9 ARTICULO 22º- Son penas corporales: 1) La de muerte. (código penal militar) ARTICULO 54º- (Traición). El boliviano que tome armas contra Bolivia o Estado aliado, se una a sus enemigos o les preste servicios en estado de guerra, será sancionado con la pena de muerte. ARTICULO 55º- (Formas de traición). Es también traidor a la Patria, por complicidad con el enemigo extranjero y pasible igualmente a la pena de muerte. ARTICULO 24º- (Aplicación). Las penas de muerte y prisión militar, llevarán consigo, la degradación. La pena de muerte se ejecutará por fusilamiento.” ARTICULO 63º- (Destrucción). El que en cualquier forma y con ánimo de perjudicar a la defensa y seguridad de la Nación, destruya, inutilice o desmejore edificios, materiales, implementos, obras, servicios, instalaciones militares y otros sufrirá la pena de cinco a quince años de prisión en tiempo de paz y de muerte en estado de guerra. Decreto Ley No. s13321 de 22 de enero de 1976.
10 “No existe la pena de muerte.” Article 15, Nueva Constitución Política del Estado. Congreso Nacional de Bolivia. October 2008. The previous version of Bolivian constitution also forbid the death penalty.
11 Bolivia has been a state party to the American Convention on Human Rights since 19 July 1979 and has recognized the obligatory jurisdiction of the Court since 27 July 1993. See also Susan Lee, Amnesty International Regional Director. Letter to Leopoldo Fernández, Minister of Government, 22 Oct. 2001.
12 “Encuesta de Opinión: Fuerzas armadas: ‘Realidad y perspectiva institucional.’ Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Unidad de Análisis de Políticas de Defensa, 1998. p. 15. The broad-based study is based on the survey of a representative sample of approximately 10 percent of the members of the armed forces, with even distribution in terms of membership, rank, age, and posting.
13 Excerpt from Ledebur, Kathryn. “Bolivia: Clear Consequences.” In Eds. Coletta Youngers and Eileen Rosin, Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy. Lynne Rienner. 2005.