On September 15, the Obama administration submitted the Memorandum of Justification explaining their decision to name Bolivia as a country that “failed demonstrably… to adhere to their obligations under international counternarcotics agreements” for the second year in a row. Once again the determination presents inaccurate, poorly prepared information, further complicated by confusing language.
Without reliable, coherent information, it is impossible to evaluate Bolivia’s drug control performance. Although like all drug control efforts, Bolivia’s program faces multiple challenges, false assertions contained in the Memorandum further impede bilateral relations. Any future efforts to redefine U.S. -Bolivian relations and cooperation must be based on a precise, realistic assessment of past interactions and the realization that the decision to “decertify” with a faulty justification has put the U.S. even farther out of step with the international community and Latin American multilateral anti-drug initiatives.
1. “Bolivia continues to engage in law enforcement operations to disrupt drug labs, but these operations frequently fail to seize drugs processed at the lab and only result in the arrest of low-level workers.”
For the second time, the English language memorandum sent to Congress contradicts the information released in Spanish by the U.S. Embassy in La Paz. The Press Release in Spanish reads: “We observe that eradication and interdiction continue, leading to important arrests.” [1]
Actually, in the past year, Bolivian antidrug forces reported some of the largest seizures at lab sites during their history. During the long term DEA presence in Bolivia, interdiction operations only led to the arrest of low-level workers. As a result this maintains the status quo of previous interdiction operations, and does not represent a deterioration resulting from the DEA removal.
2. ”The United States in engaged with Bolivia in a bilateral dialogue process designed to reach agreement on joint actions to be taken regarding issues of mutual interest, including counternarcotics…”
In fact, the U.S. State Department put the dialogue process on hold for four months. Within this void, the decision to “decertify” Bolivia and the decision to not renew Bolivia’s trade preferences contrasted sharply with the diplomatic tone of previous negotiations.
3. “Interdiction forces lack the intelligence and operation capacities to identify and dismantle drug trafficking organizations.”
Although Bolivian anti-drug forces no longer receive U.S. DEA intelligence, they are working to strengthen bilateral and multilateral mechanisms with neighboring countries, and the U.S. has no means to evaluate the quantity or quality of this information exchange. Furthermore, the Memorandum later contradicts itself by asserting that, “Bolivia’s neighbors report increased seizures of Bolivian drug and arrests of drug traffickers linked to Bolivia, which could be an indication of increased cross-border cooperation and intelligence sharing.” Bolivia has signed bilateral intelligence agreements including intelligence-sharing with Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay.
4. “Current seizure rates, while on par with prior years have not kept up with the rise in coca cultivation and cocaine production.”
Paradoxically, the June 2009 Obama administration ATPDEA justification memo notes, “Interdiction of drugs and precursor chemicals continues to rise, and the Bolivian counternarcotics police and other CN units have improved coordination effectiveness.”
Furthermore, according to official Bolivian figures, the number of interdiction operations and seizures has increased since the DEA’s departure. Between November 1, 2008, when the DEA ceased operating in Bolivia, and June 7, 2009, Bolivian anti-drug forces carried out 7,058 missions, confiscating 1,818 kilograms of cocaine and marijuana. During the same period a year earlier, with DEA support, anti-drug forces conducted 6,903 missions and seized 1,136 kilograms of illegal drugs.
5. “Bolivia’s policies and actions continued to encourage the illicit cultivation of coca, leading to an 8 percent net increase in coca cultivation in 2008.”
Information presented in diverse Obama administration documents is contradictory and confusing:
* ATPDEA decision (June 30, 2009): 32,000 hectares coca production in 2008.
* Original INCSR submitted to Congress (March 2, 2009): 29,500 hectares coca production in 2008.
* Revised INCSR contains no statistics for 2008. (The State Department modified coca cultivation figures in the INSCR on its website, and provided a link to the “version submitted to Congress” without any explanation.) [2]
* Justification Memo (September 15, 2009): contains no statistics on coca cultivation in hectares.
The revised INCSR does not publish the 2007 – 2008 percent increase statistic, instead incorrectly listing only the 2006 – 2007 figures at 14 percent. The ATPDEA decision cites “approximately 32,000 hectares” coca cultivation for 2008. Using this figure and the numbers from the revised INCSR, the percent increase from 2007 – 2008 should be 7.8 percent, not 14 percent.
However, If we use the original INCSR numbers, the percent increase for 2007 – 2008 should be only 2.03 percent.
For the same year, the UNODC cited a 6 percent increase in coca production.
6. “The Government of Bolivia also failed to develop and execute a national drug strategy consistent with its international obligations.”
In fact, the Bolivian government did develop a comprehensive anti drug strategy in 2006 [http://www.fonadal.gov.bo/archivos/EstratLuchaDrogas.pdf] and comply with the terms and conditions of this plan. The wording of the Memorandum’s critique on this point is particularly ambiguous and confusing, making it difficult to understand if they are disqualifying Bolivia based on failure to meet international obligations, execute a national drug strategy, or create such a plan. Nor does the Memorandum cite the standards by which the national drug strategy is being measured.
7. “Compounded by improved processing methods, the United States Government estimates potential cocaine hydrochloride production increased in Bolivia during 2008 by 50 percent to 195 metric tons.”
The March 2009 INCSR cited that the same production increase was only “at least 120 metric tons, although could increase by as much as sixty percent.”
The UNODC lists only a nine percent potential cocaine increase for 2008 – 41 percent less than the U.S. Memorandum’s figure. Also according to UNODC, Bolivian cocaine production increased, but remains just 13 percent of the Andean total, far behind Peru and Colombia. [3] This discrepancy is particularly notable because the U.S. helps fund the UNODC survey.
8. “[The Bolivian Government’s] efforts to restrict coca cultivation at one cato (approximately one quarter of a hectare) per family registered to grow coca are not adhered to by coca cultivators.”
The June 2009 UNODC report notes “where the cato system had been successfully implemented, farmers generally respect the government-mandated limit.” It goes on to assert that “aerial photographs and videos obtained during monitoring, like last year, clearly demonstrate a tendency to grow coca in cato-sized plots.”[4]
In the Chapare region a cato is approximately one-sixth of a hectare (1600 square meters), not one-fourth of a hectare (2500 square meters). Even in the peripheral areas of the La Paz Yungas, where the implementation of the cato system as one-fourth of a hectare faced greater obstacles, by September 30, 2009, the Bolivian government had eliminated 339 hectares through the social control program. This is the largest amount of coca reduction ever documented in that region.
9. “With at least 45, 000 coca growers in the country, this has resulted in an additional 11.250 hectares of coca growth in Bolivia.”
Again, the statistics are inaccurate. There are approximately 45,000 registered coca growers in the Chapare region, and more in the La Paz Yungas.
10. “A United States-Bolivian bilateral agreement in 2006 established 5,000 hectares as a baseline coca eradication goal with increases in eradication each year until a maximum of 8,000 hectares is met.”
The agreement states that the Bolivian government will reduce coca starting at a baseline goal of 5,000 hectares annually, until they reach the eventual goal of 8,000 hectares. It specifies that this agreement is subject to the availability of resources from bilateral and multilateral sources, but does not stipulate a required yearly incremental increase.
11. ”However, Bolivia has not moved beyond the baseline minimum of 5000 hectares to effectively counter rising coca production and achieve net reductions.”
Bolivia has surpassed the five thousand hectare minimum requirement each year of the Morales government. According to the 2009 INCSR:
2006 5,070 ha
2007 6,269 ha
2008 5,484 ha
On October 11, 2009, the Bolivian government announced that it had eliminated 5,064 in 2009. Joint Task Force Commander Carlos Ruck estimates that Bolivia may eradicate more than 6,000 hectares of coca cultivation by end of year. [5]
Bolivian coca yield remains the lowest of the three major producing countries, at just 18.2 percent of the Andean total, behind Peru (33.5 percent) and Colombia (48.3 percent).
[1] U.S. Embassy in La Paz. “Declaración de la Embajada de Estados Unidos en Bolivia.” 15 September 2009. This also occurred with the release of the 2009 INCSR.
[2] U.S. State Department, INCSR, March 2009, at: http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2009/vol1/116520.htm (various versions).
[3] United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC), Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca: Bolivia, June 2009. p. 13.
[4] UNODC, June 2009, p.56.
[5] ABI, “BOLIVIA SUPERA META DE ERRADICACIÓN ANUAL DE CULTIVOS EXCEDENTARIOS DE COCA.” 12 October 2009.